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Estimating another person’s subjective confidence is crucial for social interaction, but how this inference is
achieved is unknown. Previous research has demonstrated that the speed at which people make decisions
is correlated with their confidence in their decision. Here, we show that (i) subjects are able to infer the sub-
jective confidence of another person simply through the observation of their actions and (ii) this inference is
dependent upon the performance of each subject when executing the action. Crucially, the latter result sup-
ports a model in which motor simulation of an observed action mediates the successful understanding
of other minds. We conclude that kinematic understanding allows access to the higher-order cognitive
processes of others, and that this access plays a central role in social interactions.
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Sharing of subjective confidence is suggested to be critical
for group decision-making [1,2]. However, how individ-
uals infer each other’s confidence in decision-making
has not been addressed. Previous research has shown
that the speed at which the subject makes a forced
choice decision is correlated with their confidence, with
reaction times being faster for more confident decisions
([3], electronic supplementary material, figure S3). One
prevalent notion is that reaction times provide an internal
cue as to the difficulty of the decision, such that longer
reaction times tend to indicate lower confidence decisions
[4]. In an evidence accumulation framework, reaction
times naturally vary with the strength of evidence support-
ing one or other choice and noise in the accumulation
process, both of which are predictors of the correctness of
the decision [5,6]. We hypothesized that reaction time
might serve as a useful cue for the inference of confidence
in the decision-making of others. Here, we ask whether
simply observing another individual’s actions, in lieu
of explicit communication, is sufficient for inferring
subjective confidence.
Interest in action observation has grown in the last two
decades, in part owing to the neurophysiological discovery
of mirror neurons in the monkey ventral premotor cortex
and inferior parietal cortex. These neurons discharge
when the monkey performs specific hand movements and
also when it observes a human performing the same move-
ments [7–10]. Many believe that mirror neurons provide a
conduit to ‘turn visual information into knowledge’
[11,12]. Indeed, it has been proposed that one’s actions
are intrinsically linked to perception, and that imagining,
observing, preparing, or in any way representing an
action excites the motor programmes used to execute that
same action [13,14]. Action observation can be describedfor correspondence (j.kilner@ucl.ac.uk).
ic supplementary material is available at http://dx.doi.org/
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action, the short-term goals required to realize the overall
intention, and the kinematics of the action, or how the
hand and arm move through space [15,16]. The majority
of previous research into action observation has focused
on the role of the motor system in inferring the goal or
intention of the observed action [12]. More recently, it
has been shown that subjects are also sensitive to subtle
changes in the kinematics of an observed action [17–23].
In the current study, we ask whether subjects correctly
infer another person’s confidence simply through the
observation of their actions. To the extent that this infer-
ence is mediated by the action observation system, we
hypothesize that confidence will be judged as relative to
the observer’s own actions. Our results reveal a mechanism
by which important social information required for optimal
group decisions could be shared between individuals
without explicit communication.2. METHODS
(a) Participants
Seventeen subjects were recruited for the study, 10 males and
seven females, with a mean age of 21 (range, 20–26). Sub-
jects were recruited from the University of London. All
subjects gave signed consent and the study was approved
by a local ethical committee. Of the 17 subjects, two subjects,
one male and one female, performed only one of the tasks—
the execution task. The actions of these two subjects were
video recorded with their consent and data from these
videos were used in the second task—the observation task.
The remaining 15 subjects performed first an execution
task and then an observation task.
(b) The execution task
The experiment involved a contrast discrimination task iden-
tical to that used by Fleming et al. [3]. Subjects were shown
two images in swift succession on a computer screen. Each
image consisted of six Gabor gratings (circular patches of
smoothly varying light and dark bars) arranged around aThis journal is q 2012 The Royal Society
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screen of luminance 3.66 cd m22 (see electronic supple-
mentary material, figure S1a). In one of the two images,
all of the Gabor gratings were set at the same contrast
(‘baseline Gabors’), but in the other image, one of
the Gabors was set to be a higher contrast than the other
five ‘baseline’ Gabors, and appeared as a ‘pop-out’. ‘Base-
line’ Gabors were displayed at a contrast of 20 per cent
(where 0% was not a visible difference between the light
and dark grating bars and 100% is the maximum difference).
The ‘pop-out’ Gabors varied in contrast between 23 and
80 per cent, in increments of 3 per cent. The appearance
of the ‘pop-out’ Gabor in either the first or second image,
its contrast and its spatial position (orientation around the
central point) in each trial varied randomly throughout
the experiment [3].
After presentation of the two images, the subject was
required to make a decision as to which image (first or
second) they believed contained the ‘pop-out’. After each
decision, subjects were asked to rate their confidence on a
scale of 1–6 (1 denoting lowest possible confidence). The par-
ticipants were required to express their choice by using their
dominant hand on a custom-made response board (see the
electronic supplementary material, figure S1b). The board
comprised four separate sensors: a sensor on which the hand
rested between each trial, a sensor on which a marble was
placed, and two sensors, each within holes equidistant from
the resting position of the marble that sensed when the
marble was placed into the hole. After the presentation of
the two images a grey screen appeared with the numbers ‘1’
and ‘2’. To convey their forced decision as to which image con-
tained the ‘pop out’ Gabor, the participant was required to
move the marble from its rest position in the centre of the
board and place it on either the left or right hole, correspond-
ing to the first or second image, respectively. Subjects were
given no instruction as to how fast or slow to move the
marble. Depending on where the marble was placed (after
the marble and hand are returned to their original rest pos-
itions on the board), a red square frame appeared around
either ‘1’ or ‘2’ on the computer screen to highlight the partici-
pant’s decision. Following this, an additional grey screen with
the numbers ‘1’–‘6’ appeared, requiring the participant to
rate their confidence in the decision they have just made on
a scale of 1–6 (1 being least confident). This rating was
expressed using the numerical keys of the QWERTY keypad
on the laptop using their non-dominant hand (i.e. the hand
that is not placed on the sensor), and subsequently a red
square frame appeared around the selected rating.
The contrast of the ‘pop-out’ Gabor was adjusted
throughout the experiment using a two-up, one-down stair-
case procedure such that all participants converged onto a
final score of approximately 71 per cent correct (correct
referring to making the right decision as to which of the
two images contained the pop-out). The staircase operated
such that after two consecutive correct decisions the contrast
was decreased by one step, whereas after one incorrect
decision the contrast was increased by one step. This was
done to ensure that the analysis of movement time (MT)
and confidence was not affected by performance. It also
helped one to ensure that subjects used the full extent of
the confidence scale. Fifteen subjects performed 50 trials of
this task in one block. The two subjects whose actions were
recorded performed four blocks of 50 trials making 200
trials in total for each of these subjects.Proc. R. Soc. B (2012)(c) The observation task
In this task, subjects were asked to watch a series of video
clips showing the hand movements of the two anonymized
actors (one male and one female) during the execution
task. All video clips were edited to start 300 ms prior to
onset of the movement. After watching each clip, subjects
were asked to rate how confident they felt the individuals in
the videos were in their decisions in the same way as in the
execution task. No feedback was given for this task. Ten of
a possible 400 trials were omitted, as they were longer than
6 s in duration. The experiment therefore consisted of 390
trials that were presented in a random order. Subjects per-
formed three blocks of 100 trials and one block of 90
trials, with an interval between each.(d) Data analysis
Data for two subjects were not analysed as they did not
understand the task instructions for the execution task leav-
ing 13 subjects for further analysis. The first 10 trials were
excluded from analysis to allow for adaptation to the task.
All trials in which the movement was .6 s were removed
from further analysis. For the execution data, we correlated
four different time intervals of the movement with the sub-
jects’ rating of confidence across trials. These intervals were
the response time (RT), the time the subject began to
move, the pick up time (PT), the time when the subject
picked up the marble and the end time (ET), the time
when the marble was placed in either the left or right
response hole. In addition, we calculated the MT, the differ-
ence between the ET and the RT. All timing measures were
log-transformed prior to analysis to render them normally
distributed. For each subject, we calculated the gradient of
the linear dependency between the four timing measures
and confidence. In addition, we calculated the linear depen-
dency between the mean MT and the mean confidence level
across subjects. The gradient of these linear correlations was
then used as summary statistics for each subject.
For the observation task, we calculated the linear depen-
dency between MT and the observer’s confidence (oCon)
and between the actor’s confidence and the oCon. As
before, we used the gradients of the linear correlations as
our summary statistics for each subject. To assess whether
there was a dependency of the parameters of execution on
perception we performed three analyses. First, we asked
whether there was a relationship between the difference in
mean inferred confidence (iCon) and mean performed confi-
dence (pCon) and the difference in the mean observed MT
(oMT) and the mean performed MT (pMT) (see electronic
supplementary material, figure S2). This measure was used
to test the hypothesis that, on average, subjects inferred the
confidence of the actor relative to how they performed the
action. Second, we asked whether the linear dependency
between MT and confidence was the same for the execution
and observation tasks. To this end, we performed a corre-
lation between the linear gradients of each subject for the
execution and observation conditions. If subjects used their
motor system to infer the confidence from the observed
action, then one would predict that the relationship between
pCon and pMT will be the same as that between the
iCon and the oMT (see electronic supplementary material,
figure S2). Finally, we made a prediction of the mean iCon
from the oMTs and correlated this prediction with the
actual mean iCon. The predicted mean iCon was generated
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Figure 1. Action execution. (a) The average time for three of the timing measures, RT (open circles), PT (grey circles) and ET
(black circles) across subjects for the six confidence levels. (b) The mean gradient from the linear correlation of confidence level
with the log-transformed timing data for RT (open circles), PT (grey circles) and ET (black circles) across subjects. Asterisk
indicates significant differences at p, 0.05. (c) The mean movement time, MT, averaged across subjects for each confidence
level. (d) The relationship between mean MT and mean confidence for each subject. In each panel, errorbars show s.e. of
the mean.
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regression equation.
(e) Analysis of metacognitive sensitivity to
others’ decisions
Here, we used a non-parametric estimate of metacognitive sen-
sitivity that characterized the probability of being correct for a
given level of confidence. Receiver-operating characteristic
(ROC) curves were anchored at [0, 0] and [1, 1]. An ROC
curve that bows sharply upwards indicates that the probability
of being correct rises rapidly with confidence; conversely, a flat
ROC function indicates a weak link between confidence and
accuracy. To plot the ROC, hi ¼ p(confidence ¼ i jcorrect)
and fi ¼ p(confidence ¼ i j incorrect) were calculated for all
i. These probabilities were then transformed into cumulative
probabilities. The area underlying the ROC curve (AROC)
was calculated by the sum of the area between the ROC
curve and the major diagonal and the area of the half-square
triangle below the major diagonal:
AROC ¼ 0:25
X0
k¼1
½ðhkþ1  fkÞ2  ðhk  fkþ1Þ2 þ 0:5:
Data shown here are available at doi:10.5061/dryad.q0k1mProc. R. Soc. B (2012)3. RESULTS
(a) Relationship between confidence and
kinematics when executing the action
In keeping with previous studies [3], we showed that
the subjects’ level of confidence in their decision was corre-
lated with their RT (figure 1a, open circles). Across
subjects, the slope of the regression between confidence
and the log of the RT was significantly negative
(t12 ¼ 25.43; p, 0.05); in addition, nine of the 13 sub-
jects showed a significant correlation (p, 0.05) between
confidence and log RT. Crucially, there was also a signifi-
cant correlation between both PT and ET and the
subjects’ level of confidence (t12¼ 25.12; p, 0.05,
t12 ¼ 26.54; p, 0.05 for PT and ET, respectively:
figure 1a,b grey and black circles and bars). PT and ET
had a greater effect on subjects’ confidence than the
RT measure, with the average slope being significan-
tly more negative for both PT and ET than RT
(t12 ¼ 23.86; p, 0.05; and t12 ¼ 27.43; p, 0.05
respectively). Further, the effect of ETon confidence was sig-
nificantly greater than PT (t12 ¼ 23.84; p, 0.05). This
result demonstrates that subjects’ confidence is not only
reflected in the time it takes to respond, but also is reflected
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Figure 2. Action observation. The plots of the mean MTs of the observed actions that were rated at the six different confidence
levels. (a) The raw average MT and (b) the same data for the log-transformed MTs. (c) The relationship between the average
confidence ratings of the person executing the action and those inferred by the observer. In each panel, error bars show s.e. of
the mean.
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kinematics may provide a social cue to confidence.
As the aim of this study was to relate parameters of
the kinematics all further analyses were restricted to the
MT, defined as the difference in time between the ET
and RT measures. Therefore, for performed actions the
key parameters were the pMT and pCon. There was a
significant effect of subjects’ pCon on pMT (figure 1c
t12 ¼ 24.75; p , 0.05). Having shown that there was a
significant relationship between subjects’ confidence in
their decision and their MT, we investigated whether a
similar relationship was present across subjects. In other
words, we hypothesized that subjects who are on average
less confident in their decision tend to move slower than
those who are more confident. This is what was found.
Across subjects, there was a significant correlation
between subjects mean pCon and their mean pMT
(figure 1d; R2 ¼ 0.32, p , 0.05).(b) Relationship between confidence and
kinematics when observing an action
The results of figure 1 establish a significant and consist-
ent relationship between kinematic parameters of a reach
and grasp action and subjects’ confidence in theirProc. R. Soc. B (2012)decision. We next asked whether observers harnessed
this relationship to infer another actor’s level of decision
confidence when observing their actions. To this end,
we asked subjects to observe a series of video clips show-
ing one of two people performing the same discrimination
task described above. The video clips showed only the
reach, pick up and decision part of the task. All video
clips were edited so that they had the same RT of
300 ms. After each video observers were asked to judge
the actor’s decision confidence in the same way as
before (iCon). Therefore, for observed action the key par-
ameters were the oMT, the oCon and the iCon. Across
subjects, there was a significant correlation between the
oMT and the iCon rating (figure 2a,b; t12 ¼ 29.57,
p , 0.05). In addition, 12 out of 13 observers demon-
strated a significant correlation (p , 0.05) between the
oMT and their iCon level. Importantly, there was also a
significant correlation between the actor’s oCon rating
in their decision and that estimated by the observer,
iCon (figure 2c; t12 ¼ 9.21; p , 0.05).(c) Relationship between perception and action
The previous results demonstrate that when observing
someone else’s action, it is possible to infer their level of
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Figure 3. Relationship between action execution and perception. (a) The mean MTs for each subject. The grey bars show the
data for those subjects who performed the observation task whereas the white bars show the mean MT for the two subjects
whose actions were recorded for the observation conditions. The data on the left shows the data for subjects whose mean con-
fidence rating was less than the mean confidence ratings of the observed actions and the data on the right shows the data for
subjects whose mean confidence rating was more than the mean confidence ratings of the observed actions. (b) The mean
difference in MTs across subjects for subjects with mean confidence less than that of the observed actions (black bar), subjects
with mean confidence more than that of the observed actions (white bar) and the modelled data across all subjects where
the data for the white bars is multiplied by 21 (grey bar). Asterisk indicates a significant effect p , 0.05. (c) The plot of
the gradient of the relationship between MT and confidence for the execution and observation conditions for each subject.
(d) The relationship between the actual mean inferred confidence and predicted mean inferred confidence for each subject.
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there is a correlation between these metrics does not
mean that the observer used their motor system to infer
the level confidence. One alternative strategy would be
for the observer simply to rate faster trials as more confi-
dent and vice versa. Indeed, the majority of subjects
reported in a post-experimental debrief that they noted
that some movements were faster than others. To test
whether there was a statistical link between action and
perception, we asked whether subjects judge actions rela-
tive to how they would have performed the same action.
In other words, are subjects who rate observed decisions
as having greater confidence than their own decisions
also slower than the average MT on the videotape? This
was indeed the case. Of the 10 subjects who rated the
actor as more confident on average than their own
decisions, eight of them moved more slowly than theProc. R. Soc. B (2012)actor. Of the three subjects who rated the actor as less
confident than themselves, all three moved faster than
the observed actions (figure 3a). Therefore, 11 out of
the 13 subjects had behaviour consistent with judge-
ments of confidence being relative to one’s own actions
(p , 0.05 Sign-test; t12 ¼ 3.27, p , 0.05; figure 3b).
This provides evidence that a subject’s model of how to
execute the action is employed when observing others’
actions. To further test this claim, we investigated the
relationship between the impact of MT on confidence
during execution and observation. We hypothesized that
if subjects used a model of their own actions when infer-
ring the confidence of others, then MT–confidence slopes
should positively be correlated across action and obser-
vation conditions. This is precisely what we found. The
slopes describing the relationship between MT and confi-
dence were significantly correlated across conditions
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Figure 4. Relationship between inferred confidence and metacognition. (a) The AROC measure for each of the 13 subjects when
observing the decisions of an actor (dark grey circles). The light grey circles show the same AROC measure for the two actors.
(b) The mean of the AROC measure across subjects (individual measures are shown as open circles). The grey bars show a group
AROC measure calculated using four different methods (see the text). Finally, the mean AROC for the actors is shown.
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prediction of each subject’s iCon level solely from their
confidence–MT relationship during the execution task
given the oMT (from subject-specific linear regression
parameters). We found that a simple prediction derived
from movement execution parameters accounted for
25 per cent of the variance in iCon ratings, reaching
trend-level significance (R2 ¼ 0.25, p ¼ 0.07; figure 3d).(d) Relationship between perceived confidence and
observed decision performance
All the previous analyses focussed on the observers’ abil-
ity to infer the confidence of the actor. We next asked
whether the iCon is sensitive to whether the actor’s
decision was correct or incorrect. We adapted a measure
of this sensitivity, AROC, previously employed to investi-
gate subjects’ ability to monitor their own decisions [3].
Across observers, this AROC measure was significantly
greater than chance (AROC ¼ 0.5; t12 ¼ 5.63, p , 0.05;
figure 4a,b). Although significant, the metacognitive sen-
sitivity of the observer was less than the sensitivity of the
actor (t12 ¼ 213.6; p , 0.05; figure 4a,b).
We additionally asked whether pooling iCon across the
group could improve on the metacognitive sensitivity of
any given individual. We tested four models of group
decision-making by calculating for each trial a ‘group’ con-
fidence rating that was either (i) the mean confidence level
across subjects; (ii) the maximum confidence value across
subjects; (iii) the mean confidence level having first mean-
corrected each subject’s confidence level across trials; and
(iv) the mean confidence level having first z-scored each
subject’s confidence level across trials. Of these measures,
the two corrected confidence levels showed a significant
improvement on individual AROC measures. Indeed, the
group mean-corrected AROC measure outperformed any
of the 13 individual AROC measures (figure 4b).Proc. R. Soc. B (2012)4. DISCUSSION
Here, we demonstrate that people are able to correctly infer
the subjective confidence of another person simply from
the kinematics of their observed action. In addition, we
show that the relationship between the kinematics of the
observed action and inferred subjective confidence could
be explained by each individual subject’s confidence–
movement speed relationship. These results are consistent
with the idea that the subjects employed their own motor
system to make an inference on the observed actions.
In the last two decades, there has been a large body of
research investigating the role of the motor system in
action understanding [11,12,15,16,24–27]. However,
there is no real consensus on whether ‘understanding’
during action observation depends upon activity in the
motor system [11,12,15,16,24–27]. Ever since the discov-
ery of mirror neurons in area F5 of the macaque monkey,
the majority of research has focussed on the role of the
motor system in inferring the goal or the intention of the
observed action. However, there is little compelling evi-
dence in support of this functional role [24,25]. In
particular, there is very little evidence that has shown a cor-
relation between people’s ability to correctly perceive the
goal and their ability to execute an action with the same
goal. Here, we have shown that variance in subjects’ per-
ception of others’ subjective states can be explained by
variance in the way subjects execute their own actions.
Rather than making an inference based on the goal or
intention of the observed action, here subjects made their
inference based on the kinematics of observed action.
The kinematics of an action is a relatively low-level
description of the action, and it is not immediately obvious
why it would be of functional importance to ‘understand’
the observed action at this level. However, we know that
parameters of the kinematics of an action, for example
RT, are modulated by a wide range of higher-order cogni-
tive processes as evidenced by the fact that mental
Inferring subjective states D. Patel et al. 4859
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chology [28]. One possibility is that by ‘understanding’
the action at the kinematic level, we have access to these
higher-order cognitive processes—here, the confidence of
the actor that their decision was correct. The importance
of action understanding and inference at the level of
the kinematics is supported by studies that have demon-
strated that subjects are able to make high-level
inferences based only on changes in the kinematics of the
observed action [23,29,30].
A predictive coding model of action understanding
holds that the motor system and mirror neurons generate
a prediction of the kinematics of the observed action,
rather than being driven by the observed action itself
[16,17,31]. To date the majority of work providing evi-
dence for these models has focussed on the inference of
the goal of the action [32,33]. Here, we demonstrate a
systematic relationship between subjective confidence
and action kinematics. Furthermore, and consistent
with a predictive coding account, our results reveal that
the observer assesses the confidence of an observed
action relative to how they themselves would execute
the same action. Firstly, we have shown that observed
actions that were slower than subject’s own actions were
ascribed less confidence (figure 3a,b), Secondly, we
have shown that the relationships between MT and confi-
dence under observation and execution conditions were
correlated across subjects (figure 3c,d). Within this frame-
work, one possibility is that an observer makes a
prediction of the kinematics of the action as if they were
going to perform the action using their own motor
system. This prediction is then compared with the
actual kinematics. If the action is faster than predicted,
observers rate the action as more confident, and if it is
slower, then they rate the action as less confident.
The degree to which confidence is modulated by the
difference between the predicted and actual kinematics
depends upon the observer’s internal relationship
between confidence and MT.
Although the results are consistent with the role of the
motor system in inferring confidence from an observed
action, there are other possible explanations of the results.
One possibility is that the perceptual inference is achieved
by purely visual discrimination. Indeed, this is possible if
subjects have learnt the mapping between the kinematics
of the observed actions and confidence. However, it
should be noted that the kinematics of an action are
dependent not only on confidence but also on many
other factors including object properties such as the
shape, size and texture. Therefore, any purely visual map-
ping between the kinematics and the confidence would
also have to accommodate differences in the kinematics
that are orthogonal to confidence. It will be of importance
for future studies to disambiguate between a purely visual
account and a motor account of these effects [29,34].
Recent work has shown that sharing confidence
between individuals can improve group decision-making
[1]. How this confidence sharing is carried out has
remained unclear. One simple means of understanding
another person’s confidence is via explicit, metacognitive
communication. But such communication may be noisy,
and in some circumstances may actually reduce the per-
formance benefit of sharing [35]. Another perspective is
that confidence could be directly ‘read out’ from anotherProc. R. Soc. B (2012)individual’s decisions without explicit communication
[2]. Here, we provide a mechanism for which this implicit
readout might occur. By relying on the relationship
between movement kinematics and subjective confidence,
individuals can harness action observation to infer
another individual’s level of subjective confidence.
Future studies could usefully examine whether this mech-
anism contributes to the wisdom of crowds. More
generally, our results support an intimate link between
decision confidence and the temporal dynamics of the
decision itself [36].
One of the central planks of the motor simulation
theory is that action understanding is critical for social
interaction [12]. Indeed, a dominant view is that deficits
in social interaction are in part owing to a failure of cor-
rect motor simulation ([37–39], but see [40] for an
alternative view). As mentioned previously, the majority
of this research has focussed on the inference of goals
and intentions. The results here show that subjective
states are manifest in subtle changes in the way in which
an action is executed. One possibility is that use of our
own motor system to simulate the kinematics of an
observed action permits estimation of someone else’s
higher-order cognitive states—confidence [3], values
[41] and emotions [42,43]—simply by observing their
actions. Having access to this information is of clear
importance in social interactions, perhaps even more so
than being able to infer the intended goal or intention
of an observed action.This work was funded by the Wellcome Trust, UK.REFERENCES
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